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How do food safety regulations influence market price? 
A theoretical analysis. 
 
1. Introduction  
A part of European food safety legislation model is based on imposition of Maximum 
Residue Limit (MRL)
1
. This regulatory tool specifies the maximum admitted thresholds of 
contaminants in a product for instance aflatoxin, dioxin, heavy metals etc. The Regulation 
(EC) n.396/2005 (Council regulation no 396/2005) assigns MRLs for pesticides in every food 
and feed and the Regulation (EC) n.1881/2006 (Council regulation no 1881/2006) establishes 
MRLs for mycotoxins in foodstuffs. Beside legislation, official control schemes are designed 
to verify the compliance with feed and food law (Regulation (EC) n.882/2004). All these 
regulations have one goal: to reduce the food-related risk of consumption and to preserve the 
health of consumers. From the economic perspective, an important issue deals with the impact 
of these food safety constraints imposed on productive systems on various economic index, 
particularly on the price that emerge in the market. 
Indeed, one of the challenges of food safety regulations is the impact they can have on the 
economic performances, including a price increase of food commodities and their scarcity on 
the market. The other fear is that if regulations are too demanding, they could threaten the 
participation of small producers in the country's production system. These threats are even 
more real because the stringent health regulations require high level of logistics investments, 
extensive producer training etc.  
The Industrial Economics literature most likely to analyses product quality issues is the 
Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) literature (Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Scarpa, 1998; 
Garella and Petrakis, 2008). However, this literature is most often focused on situations where 
product quality is recognized by consumers and becomes a differentiation strategy for firms
2
. 
As pointed by Hammoudi et al. (2009), this literature commonly focuses on an overall quality 
without explicitly separating the attributes of food safety and other attributes (taste, quality, 
appearance etc.). Moreover, these works, which generally based on vertical differentiation 
models (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Dixit, 1979; Das and Donnenfeld, 1989), are not appropriate 
                                                            
1
 The Maximum Residue Limit (MRL) is the highest level of a pesticide residue that is legally tolerated in food 
or feed when pesticides are applied correctly (Good Agricultural Practice).  
2
 Some theoretical works try to fill this gap by proposing an alternative to the existing model where the consumers 
have indirect information about this quality. Rouvière and Soubeyran (2011) consider the imposition of MQS under 
the effect of reputation: a product of low-quality generates a negative externality of the industry. They show that the 
imposition of a MQS may reduce the exclusion in the market by inducing firms to enter in the market. 
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to food safety issues where the consumer don’t recognize the sanitary attribute of the 
product
3
.  In fact, few works have focused on ensuring the safety of generic products traded 
on spot markets (for example, on wholesale markets) where public systems of food safety 
regulation play a significant role. The exceptions are the work of Giraud Héraud et al. (2012), 
which targets more specific problems (emergence of private standards), and the work of 
Grazia et al. (2012) where the context studied is a simple international supply chain 
(exporter/importer relationships)
4
. There are even less works, which analyse the relationships 
between food safety constraints imposed on productive systems, the exclusion of producers, 
and the availability of food in the domestic market.  
To fill this literature gap, we propose an original study that identifies the causal 
relationship that may exist between, on the one hand, i) public food safety regulations 
(specifically, the maximum authorised levels of chemical or microbiological contaminants, 
MRL), and on the other hand, ii) the expected price in the spot markets (wholesale markets, 
for example) and the producers’ participation in agricultural activity. The model of industrial 
economics that we propose allows one to determine what market price will emerge from such 
an economy subject to public regulation constraints. Based on this, it is possible to evaluate 
the quantity of supply available on the market, the level of producer exclusion due to 
regulation and the sanitary and phytosanitary safety level associated with this market. 
The assessment of the quality level of available products and exclusion allows us to position 
our analysis in the context of the question of the link between food safety and food security in 
the quantitative sense. Even if the compatibility between food supply availability and food 
safety on markets is currently an important issue in both developing and developed and it is, 
obviously a bigger challenge for developing countries (DCs). Indeed, in contrast to developed 
countries, combating malnutrition remains a major challenge for DCs which are highly 
dependent on imports and whose domestic production cannot meet growing local demand. 
Food safety has never such a high priority in DCs as in developed countries. The question 
associated with food safety is largely dominated by the concern linked to food security in 
terms of quantitative acceptance (Henson and Jaffee, 2007; Henson and Blandon, 2007). 
Consequently, food production in many DCs often has limited standardization and minimal 
imposition of food safety requirements, except in export sectors where constraints are set by 
                                                            
3 However, note that this critic cannot extrapolated to empirical literature where some studies take into account 
explicitly these specificities of food safety context (see Rouvière and Caswell, 2012; Crivelli and Groschl, 2015). 
For more details, see a limit and a critical analysis of this literature in Hammoudi et al. (2009). 
4
 See section background. 
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importing countries (Keiichiro et al., 2015)
5
. However, consumers in DCs are increasingly 
exposed to high levels of various risks with the food they consume such as pesticides (WHO, 
2004) or food poisoning (toxins and E-coli)
6
. In fact, this trend is persistent primarily because 
consumers in DCs are often non-quality-seekers or lack information regarding food-borne 
risks (Hanak et al. 2002; Kopper, 2002). Thus, the sanitary crisis continues to grow and to be 
a genuine public health concern. However, the achievement of a satisfactory level of food 
safety, i.e. better consumer health insurance, must address the capacity of these countries’ 
production systems. On the basis of these observations, the questions that we raise in this 
work include: Can the development schemes incorporate quality improvement goals without 
undermining the effectiveness of quantitative objectives? Can we attain a better safety level 
without sacrificing economic indicator levels which are socially crucial (prices, supply, and 
stakeholder participation)?  
To conduct the analysis, we use a theoretical model of industrial organisation and the 
conceptual framework of game theory. We adopt the spot market modelling proposed in 
Giraud-Héraud et al. (2012)
7
 and the control system modelling proposed by Grazia et al. 
(2012). We assume that the production system is composed of homogeneous producers, who 
have identical product costs and the same managerial capacities to comply with public 
regulation. We assume that public regulation is a combination of an authorised maximum 
residue level (of pesticides, for example
8
) and an official control system (sanitary 
inspections). In response to this regulation, producers determine the appropriate good 
agricultural practices (GAPs) (investment in resources and know-how) to implement in their 
production sites. Producers’ strategic behaviour (the strategic choice of investment level on a 
production site) has an indirect impact on the supply available in domestic markets and on the 
safety associated with these products. Indeed, among the products that are offered to 
consumers, some are compliant with the regulation and others are not compliant but passed 
the inspections because they were not detected by the imperfect official control system.   
                                                            
5
 Not that the majority of available works addressing food safety issues in DCs adopt an international trade 
perspective (Keiichiro et al. 2015). Economists do not neglect the consumer health issue, but the predominance 
of strategic development plans based on exports have, to a certain extent, oriented the economic literature in this 
direction, by relaying the DCs’ donors’ and public authorities’ concerns (Unnevehr, 2015). 
6
 We can cite several recent crises such as Aflatoxins in Kenya in 2004, food poisoning in a school in Bihar 2013 or 
the Chinese milk crisis in 2008 (for more details, refer for example to Xiu and Klein (2010), FAO/WHO (2005)).  
7
 More precisely, we use modeling of control systems and MRLs proposed by Grazia et al. (2012), which we 
extrapolate to a context with any number of producers activating a wholesale market and combine it with the 
modeling of interactions on spot markets proposed by Giraud et al. (2012). 
8
 The theoretical nature of the work allows a broad interpretation of a contamination threshold: microbiological 
contamination (e.g., aflatoxin) or micro chemical contamination (pesticides and heavy metals). 
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The originality of our model is that it shows how all variables (economic variables and 
sanitary variables) interact in the formation of agricultural prices and determine the final size 
of the productive system (number of active producers). The characterisation of the market 
price as a function of producers’ investment efforts and of the level of official control 
reliability allows us to determine both the total supply and the proportion of this supply that is 
contaminated (i.e., does not comply with the maximum threshold of contamination). We 
initially provide the expression of market prices according to private efforts (producer 
investment on the production site) and public regulation (MRL and control level). The initial 
results that we obtained show that the toughening of legislation on MRLs does not always 
improve the consumer health indicator; such improvement depends on the reliability of the 
control. When the MRL is set, improving the reliability of controls may be in some cases a 
solution to better reduce food safety risk in the market. However, even if strengthening 
controls in some cases is likely to reduce the risk, such a measure induces an ambiguous 
effect on prices. It is shown that this strengthening controls creates inflation in markets where 
controls are initially relatively unreliable while creating a fall in prices in markets where they 
were initially relatively reliable. On the other hand, we show that strengthening MRLs is not 
always synonymous with reduction of risk. It may be in some cases effective to reduce risk if 
this measure is simultaneously associated with strengthening controls. 
Moreover, the impact of reinforcing the MRL policy depends on a country’s typology, 
which is a function of the size of the domestic market’s demand. We show that the 
quantitative objective (food security in quantitative terms), the health objective (the quantity 
of contaminated food circulated in the market), and the producers’ participation objective may 
not be met simultaneously. The size of the domestic demand of the country and the control 
reliability play important roles in achieving such a result.  
2. Background 
European regulations on maximum limits for harmful substances have gradually become 
more stringent since the ‘90s. Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 on the fixing of maximum levels 
for certain contaminants have been amended several times before being repealed by 
Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006. (Grazia et al., 2014).  For example, Regulation (EC) n. 
2375/2001 adds the determination of levels of dioxin, Regulation (EC) n. 221/2002 completes 
the list of products concerned, by fixing maximum levels of heavy metals. As outlined in the 
introduction, the regulatory framework for official controls at European level is based on 
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Regulation (EC) n. 882/2004, which lays down the methods for sampling and analyzing 
samples used in official MRL compliance checks. The effectiveness of official controls 
depends, among other things, on the procedures (workers training, frequency of controls, 
number of accredited laboratories, etc.) set up by each country, and the application of 
sampling procedures (Grazia et al. 2014; Grazia et al., 2012).  
Much of descriptive works of the literature and international agencies’ reports highlight 
the limited effectiveness of controls. They often identify products introduced in the market 
which however exceed MRLs. According to the latest European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) report on pesticide residues in foods (EFSA 2016), 2.9% of the 82,649 samples 
analysed in 2014 exceeded MRLs. Theoretical or quantitative economic literature has in fact, 
hardly been studied the question related to the reliability of official controls. A branch of this 
literature focused on the issue of private controls introduced by downstream operators of 
supply chain vis-à-vis their suppliers (see for example, Chalfant et al., 1999; Starbird, 2005; 
Starbird et al. 2007). Another branch focused on the issue of private-public partnership which 
aim to substitute part of official controls by private controls (Rouvière et Caswell, 2012). For 
this part, Starbird (2005) characterizes the conditions for the effectiveness of such private 
control system in detecting noncompliant products delivered by suppliers to downstream 
agents. The authors show how the inspection policies affect the producer’s willingness to 
exert higher effort to ensure safety. Rouvière and Caswell (2012) evaluate the degree of shift 
toward co-regulation (private and public partnership) from traditional approaches (public 
regulation). Based on a case study of experience in France, the Authors show how a co-
regulation enforcement regime may induce changes in the enforcement practices of regulatory 
agencies. These changes in practices result in a shift from economic incentives based on 
punishment to incentives based on prevention (Rouvière and Caswell, 2012). Finally, Grazia 
et al. (2012) analyse under the hypothesis of imperfect controls, the impact of the vertical 
relationship between one producer in a DC and one importer in a developed country. The 
authors developed an Industrial Organization approach in order to analyse the interaction 
between the MRL legislation and control system and the impact of these interactions on the 
food safety risk associated with imports. The main originality of this study is that the food risk 
is endogenously determined through the supplier strategic response to the regulatory 
environment (investment in the quality of production practices). 
Note that the majority of studies of this branch of literature assume a simple vertical 
relationship between one producer and one upstream operator. More generally, the industrial 
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organization literature has rarely studied the process of price formation on spot market except 
some pioneer works (Zhang and Sexton, 2000; Xia and Sexton, 2004) and more recently the 
work of Géraud-Héraud (2012). Zhang and Sexton (2000) propose a spatial model to show 
how processors can manipulate the spot market prices through exclusive contracts. Xia and 
Sexton (2004) analyse the competitive implications of contractual agreements when these 
contracts are linked to the cash market price. In their model, producers are price-taking and 
have to trade-off between contract and cash market according to the contractual price. The 
authors show that with certain type of contracts, the buyers’ incentives to compete 
aggressively on the spot market decrease (Xia and Sexton, 2004).  
The work of Giraud-Héraud et al. (2012) is devoted to the analysis of the specific issue of 
private standards through the conceptual framework of endogenous formation of coalitions. 
The authors analyse the effects of the creation of collective private standards (standards 
established by a coalition of retailers) on both: i) the prices of the spot markets in which 
private standards set and ii) the market price of generic products. The authors determine the 
conditions under which the collective standard can emerge and what size coalition will form 
(complex trade-off between individual rationality and collective rationality regarding the 
stability concepts of coalitional games, see for more details Giraud-Héraud (2012)). In our 
Knowledge, this work is the only one that has formally studied the price formation issue in 
relation to spot markets. However, the spot markets in their model are subject to private food 
safety standards and not to public regulations.  
3. Model 
We consider a domestic market for a food product from which emanates demand		given 
by: 
 =  − .																																																																												1
 
Where ,  ≥ 0
 is the market size, and  is the market price, which is determined by 
equalising supply and demand.  
To ensure a healthy food supply, public authorities set regulation on the basis of two 
instruments:  
• The threshold	,  ∈ [0,1]
, which represents the maximum level of contamination 
permitted in each unit product (sanitary standard). 
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• The level of sanitary control	,  ∈ 	 [0,1]
, which is the probability that a unit of product 
is detected as contaminated (e.g., contamination threshold exceeding	)9. If the product is 
identified as contaminated, it is immediately rejected.  
We further assume that the concerned product’s domestic production system  is 
composed of	,  > 	0
, identical producers of size	1, which is the size corresponding to 
their production capacity.  
In response to the regulation	, 
, each producer  ∈ 	 invests a level ,  ∈ 	 [0,1]
 of 
good agricultural practices (GAPs) and sells his production level ,  ∈ 	 [0,1]
 on the 
domestic market.  
The producer	,  ∈ 	
, who chooses the level  of GAPs, supports the investment cost 
, 
10.  
The producer	,  ∈ 	
, who chooses the level  of GAPs, anticipates the following 
proportions of his production	:  
• The compliance probability	, 
11, which is the probability that the unit of goods 
produced with practice  complies with food safety standard	. 
• The proportion offered	, , 
, which is the probability that the unit of goods produced 
with practice  is detected by the control system  and complies with food safety standards. 
Therefore, each producer  ∈ 	 can anticipate their individual quantities , , , 
 
which are effectively sold on the domestic market and those , , , 
 that effectively 
comply with the sanitary standard: 
, , , 
 = 	, , 
; 																																																				2
 
, , , 
 = 	, 
.																																																										3
 
        The profit #	, , , , , 
 of the producer ,  ∈ 	
 who chooses the levels  of 
production and investment  is given by: 
                                                            
9
 The errors related to compliance tests can also generate false positive results (probability that an 
uncontaminated sample will be identified as contaminated, see Starbird (2007)). For simplicity, in this model, we 
assume that this probability is zero. 
10 Empirical studies have generally identified several types of costs which certain are fix and other are variables 
(see for example Crivelli and Gröschl, 2015; Henson and Jaffee, 2007; Aloui and Kenny, 2005). 
11
 The function  must be increasing in  and	; an increase in the effort of GAPs increases the probability of 
compliance for each product unit and a norm reinforcement ( decreases), decreases the compliance probability. 
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#	, , ,, , 
 = 	, , , 
 − , 
.																																	4
 
The producer’s profit is the difference between the outcome associated with the quantity that 
they offer (and is not rejected) at market price 	and the cost associated with their investment 
in GAPs. 
The main hypothesis of the model are summarized on the following figure:  
Figure 1– Strategic Interaction and price formation under MLR Constraints. 
 
The interactions between producers and public authorities through the strategic 
decision  and the decision , 
 can be represented by the following the three-stage 
dynamic game: 
Stage 1: The producers observe , 
 and simultaneously decide to enter or not in the 
production activity  
Stage 2: A producer i that has decided to enter in the activity determines his level % of 
investment in good practices taking account , 
. 
Stage 3: Each producer determines his level % of production to sell in the domestic market. 
At the end of the stage 2, the total supply intersects the total demand and the intersection 
induces the level of the market price. 
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One solves the game by Backward Induction. Note that producers make their decisions 
at different stages of the game as price takers. Since the producers have identical costs, the 
model is symmetric and the investment decided by each one at the equilibrium is % ≡ . At 
the game's equilibrium, the market price ∗ is determined by the intersection of the total 
supply offered by producers and the total market demand. Because the public authorities 
control the quantities decided by the producers, a certain proportion is rejected because it does 
not comply with sanitary standards. Following these controls, the quantities offered are those 
that pass inspection and those that are those that meet the demand and contribute to 
determining the market price	∗. Regarding the rationality of individual decisions, it is 
assumed each operator will to maximise their profit. The contamination rate is defined simply 
by the ratio of the contaminated total quantity and the total quantity offered (see more details 
in section 4.2). 
4. Resolution of the game 
To solve the game and give some original and counter-intuitive results, we will specify the 
cost function	, 
	and the compliance probability	, 
. Thus, we may be able to 
determine the explicit expression of the market price as a function of the maximum threshold 
of contamination and the level of official control. Such expression may allow us to determine 
both the total supply and the proportion of the total supply that is contaminated (i.e., does not 
comply with the maximum threshold of contamination). We propose the following general 
specifications of these functions , 
12	and	, 
13. 
, 
 = 1 − 1 − 
1 − 
;																																				 5
 
, 
 = 	).																																																																6
 
Thus, , , 
 is deduced from , 
 as follows:  
, , 
 = , 
 + 1 − 
	,1 − , 
-.															7
 
                                                            
12
 More precisely, i) at a given threshold	, and in the absence of investment effort		 = 	0
, the probability that 
a unit of good complies with  depends solely on the level of the standard, 
 = 
, and ii) at a given level  
and in the presence of the most exacting standard		 = 	0
, the probability that a unit of good complies with  
depends solely on the level of investment , 
 = 
. The proportion complies and attains its maximum level , 
 	= 	1
 if the investment effort is maximal 	 = 	1
 and/or the sanitary standard is lax		 = 	1
. 
13
 The parameter ,  ≥ 0
 represents the fixed cost of compliance, and for simplicity, we assume that the 
variable costs are zero. 
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We define the Economy studied here (noted E) by the size of the domestic market and the 
number of producers participating in the production activity. In the following sections, we assume 
that this Economy is such that	 ≤ 2	14. Then we can solve the game defined in the previous 
section and determine the investment in GAPs, the number of producers entering in the market, 
and the market price at equilibrium. The following proposition presents these main results. 
Proposition 1. 
The number ∗, 
 of producers, investment level	∗, 
, and market price ∗, 
 
at equilibrium are given by
15
: 
∗, 
 = 01 2, 3 1 − 1 − 
45 ;																														 
∗, 
 = 1 − 
 6 − ,1 − 1 − 
-
∗, 
7
2	 + )1 − 
)∗, 
 ; 
∗, 
 = 2		 6 − ,1 − 1 − 
-
∗, 
7
2	 + )1 − 
)∗, 
 .											 
First, from this proposition, we can deduce a first counter-intuitive result. Indeed, the 
control improvements may encourage excluded producers to enter the domestic 
market68	9∗:,;
8	; ≥ 07. This result can be explained by the fact that the reinforcement of 
controls involves the increase of rejected quantities and mechanically creates the possibility of 
viable outlets for potential new entrants. The result remains valid for the reinforcement of the 
admitted contaminant threshold68	9∗:,;
8	: ≤ 07. From this proposition 1, and to give an idea of 
some key results, let us distinguish two polar cases representative of the typology of 
countries: large countries (Type1) with relatively high potential demand  < 	
, which 
ensures the viability of all producers and small countries (Type 2) with relatively low 
potential demand , < ,1 − 1 − 
-- in which only a subset of producers enter the 
market at the equilibrium (partial producer access). Considering these two types of countries 
(Type 1 and Type2), we can analyse quite simply some of the consequences of proposition 1 
in terms of the health and economic impacts of i) regulations based on the variation of the 
quality of control (section 4.1) or ii) regulations based on the reinforcing of the MRL 
threshold (section 4.2). The results are given in the following sections. 
                                                            
14 This hypothesis imply that all variables at equilibrium are prior solutions (particularly,	∗, 
 ∈ 	 [0,1[). 
15
 The notation = >?@;?@:
Ais used in this expression to indicate the integer portion of >?@;?@:
. 
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4.1. Impact of food controls evolution 
At a given threshold	, the economic and health indicators vary according to the level of 
official control. These variations are given in Figure 2
16
 below: 
Figure 2– Producer participation, total quantity available in the market, and 
contamination rate as a function of the intensity of the controls. 
 
a) Type1countries                                                                  b) Type2 countries 
i) Impact on countries of type 1  
When a country is type1, we can easily verify that the improvement of controls and/or 
switch to more stringent standards encourage producers to improve their investments in 
GAPs. The market price in these countries can attain a maximum intermediary value B, 2B =
9@>
CD9@>
EC)	F	9
?@:
	9 5 of  ∈ ]0,1[ (see Figure 2.a). This concavity of the function ∗, 
 
compared with  can be explained by the fact that improved controls in the zone with low 
levels of efficiency G0, BH encourage producers to improve their level of investment; however, 
their practices remain too few to generate a positive variation in total supply. This is due to 
the increase in rejected quantities and the negative variation of the gap between compliant 
supply and contaminated supply. In this zone, the market price increases and the 
contamination rate decreases. In the zone associated with high levels of efficiencyGB , 1H, the 
control improvements encourage producers to make sufficiently high investments to generate 
a positive variation in the gap between the compliant supply and the contaminated quantity. In 
                                                          
16
The shape of figure 2 can be obtained with the following parameter values: 
 I) Type 1 countries:  = 40;  = 20;  = 5;  = 0.3. 
II) Type 2 countries:  = 03;  = 20; = 5;  = 0.3. 
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this case, the total supply increases, the market price decreases, and the contamination rate 
decreases. 
i) Impact on type 2 countries 
The control reinforcement can positively or negatively impact the investment in GAPs in 
type2 countries (see Figure 2.b). This is because of the negative relationship between 
investment in GAPs and the number of producers engaging in the activity; producers’ 
investment decreases relative to the number of producers present. This ambiguous result (the 
positive or negative impact of control reinforcement on investment in GAPs) leads to two 
possible effects on the price. First, in the situation in which the strengthening of control does 
not impact the number of producers, the producers improve their investment to increase their 
offers and reduce their rejected quantities. In this case, if the gap between their compliant 
quantities and their contaminated quantities varies positively, the total supply increases and, 
mechanically, the market price decreases. If not, supply decreases and the market price 
increases. Second, in the situation in which the strengthening of control induces an increase in 
the number of producers, producers’ investments are negatively impacted by the greater 
number of producers and positively impacted by incentives to improve the investment 
(because of the increase in ). When the (improving) “investment effect” outweighs the 
“participation effect”, then the offered quantities increase and the market price decreases. 
Conversely, when producers’ “participation effect” outweighs the “investment effect”, supply 
decreases because the insufficient investment is not compensated by the increase in the 
producers’ participation. As shown in Figure 1.b, one can also deduce that strengthening the 
control can have a negative or positive impact on the contamination rate in the domestic 
market depending on whether the investment in goods sufficiently increases (with a positive 
effect on compliant quantities or a reduction in the compliant quantities). 
4.2. Impact of strengthening MRL threshold 
In this section, we consider the context in which public authorities envisage a move 
toward more stringent standards. The question is whether a reinforcement of the sanitary 
standards is legitimate with respect to health objectives. We consider that the transition from a 
sanitary standard Ito a more stringent sanitary standard ?, ? ≤ I
 is legitimate with 
respect to health objectives if it at least results in a decrease in the contamination 
rateJKcompared with I and ?. In other words: 
JK,L , ?
- ≤ JK 6L , I
7,			∀	N ∈ O0,1P.																																	8
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The notation JK,L , %
- indicates the contamination rate for any level L when the 
current standard (in force) in the domestic market is%. This rate is calculated based on the 
quantity contaminated relative to the level of contaminant L when the producers respond to 
the required standard % (see Grazia et al., 2012). Thus, reinforcing the standard policy is 
considered legitimate if at least every contamination rate (compared with	%, and with	L) 
obtained after strengthening decreases with respect to the initial situation
17
. The expression of 
the different variables given in proposition 1 enables us to solve the inequality (8); therefore, 
we obtain the following result: 
Proposition 2. 
The shift from sanitary standard I to more stringent food standard?, ? ≤ I
does not 
necessarily induce an improvement in the health criterion. 
The food safety criterion used in proposition 2 is given by the relation (8). We rely on 
Figure 3 to draw conclusions concerning the effect of the shift to standard ? on the 
consumers’ health, which depends on the level of the control system
18
: 
                                                            
17
 The choice of a health criterion is particularly complex, and the existing literature in this area has suggested 
very few solutions to this problem. To the best of our knowledge, the exception is the work of Otsuki et al. 
(2001) that in an empirical study associates at each level of MLR (aflatoxins) an expected number of cancers 
within the population 
18
 The graph lines of Figure 3 are obtained from the following parameter values: 
(a) Type 1 countries:	 = 20;  = 10; 	 = 15; 	I = 0.5; ? = 0.35; 
(b) Type 2 countries:  = 10;  = 10; 	 = 15;	I = 0.5; ? = 0.35; 
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Figure 3- Impact of the shift to higher standards in consumer health. 
 
a) Type 1 countries                                                      b) Type 2 countries 
When the country is type1, e.g., in which all producers entered at equilibrium, Figure 3.a 
shows how the shift from Ito ?does not always induce an improvement in food safety. Food 
safety is improved solely through high levels of control. Indeed, it is only from a certain level 
of control that producers get the incentive to sufficiently invest and may promote a reduction 
in the contamination rate compared with both I and	?. In other words, the shift to a more 
stringent standard may not be legitimate if its accompanying control remains unreliable. 
When the country is type 2 the shift from I	to ?can induce an increase in the number of 
producers (proposition 1). The reinforcement of controls can cause the same effect. The shift 
of the regulation from Ito ? has a dual effect on the level of investment; it can provide an 
incentive for the producers to enter the market. However, this shift can also lead to a 
reduction in investments precisely because of the large number of producers engaged in the 
market (Figure 2.b). The evolution of the rate of contamination when we reinforce the 
thresholds depends on the relationship between the level of individual investment and the 
number of active producers. When investment decreases (as a consequence of the increase in 
the number of entrants, the level of contamination increases. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we use an industrial economic model to show how a spot market price can 
be influenced by the food safety regulation levels (MRL and official control level). Moreover, 
we show that the size of the targeted market and compliance costs have an important role in 
determining the level of this price. A main economic teaching of the paper is that we show 
Page 14 of 23British Food Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
British Food Journal
15 
 
how the establishment of an effective MRL regulation to control the sanitary and 
phytosanitary risk can be complex and may in some cases lead to results contrary to the 
objectives desired by the public authorities. If some parameters of the economic environment 
are not taken into account in setting the MRL thresholds (quality of controls, market size, 
compliance costs), a demanding level of the MRL can effectively reassure the consumer but 
not protect its health against food risk. In addition, regulation can not only be inefficient in 
terms of reducing food risk, but also has negative economic effects (less supply on the market, 
more exclusion from producers). 
Otherwise, the characterization of the market price allows us to provide results concerning 
the compatibility of food safety objectives and food security (in the quantitative sense). As 
pointed in the introduct on, despite the fact that the proposed model is general and applicable 
to all type of countries, regardless of their level of development, our analysis rely a major 
issue for DCs (food security versus food safety). It is also an originality of the article that to 
deal with this classical issue of development economics using the tools of game theory and 
industrial economics, relying on the strategic behaviours of the Stakeholders. The results 
obtained allow us to question some established ideas, associated for example with the effects 
of strengthening or weakening of MRL regulations (thresholds, health inspections), on prices, 
quantities, exclusion and consumer health
19
. For instance, a large number of development 
experts emphasise the opposition that may exist between constraints on production systems, 
particularly regarding food safety quality standards and the capacity of these systems to 
generate a satisfactory food supply in domestic markets. Indeed, they argue that the 
imposition of food safety constraints represents costs to producers (see, for example, 
Shafaeddin (2009), Caswell and Kleinschmit (1997)) and such costs can generate both a 
contraction in supply and an exclusion of domestic producers. We show that the classical 
thesis of opposition between quality and quantity considerations can be contradicted. The 
compatibility of food safety and food security objectives depends, among other things, on the 
control system established by the public authorities and the characteristics of the demand in 
the studied country. However, our results suggest that the quantitative criterion (food security 
in quantitative terms), the health criterion (the quantity of contaminated food consumed in the 
market) and the criterion of producers’ participation may not be ensured simultaneously. 
                                                            
19 It should be noted that even if the results obtained relate to an application (associated with a specification of 
certain functions of the model), this does not detract from the generality of the model which can be used to 
support questions other than those we have studied in this article. 
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Il is important to note that by proposing a comparative analysis of on the one hand, the 
level of economic indicators after the implementation of regulation (compliance costs, 
exclusion level, available supply and price) and on the other hand, health benefit, the work 
falls within the general framework of cost/benefit analysis and cost/effectiveness (Antle, 
1999; Otsuki et al., 2001; Rau and Tongeren, 2010). From a methodological point of view, the 
approach can be seen as a contribution to classical cost / benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analyses. As we have shown, difficulties in compliance with norms do not only and 
systematically depend on the level of compliance costs but also on the opportunistic 
behaviours of the operators and their interactions with the economic environment and the 
characteristics of the regulation (MRL, deficiencies in control system, level of the 
demand,…). Our results highlight the importance of considering competition and strategic 
interactions, which are not generally taken into account in the traditional cost/benefit and 
cost/effectiveness analyses. In this line, an interesting development of this work consist to 
slightly adapt the model in order to take into consideration an important issue in this field: the 
public-private partnerships issue (delegation of the control to private sector for example), in 
accordance with the works of Martinez et al. (2007), Narrod et al. (2009), and other authors 
cited in the introduction. This development could complement existing empirical studies 
(Rouvière and Caswell, 2012) through theoretical elucidation. 
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Mathematical appendix 
A. Resolution of the game 
A.1 Production 
At a given	, ,, , 
, the rational behaviour of a producer ,  ∈ 
 consists in seeking 
the level of production ∗, ∗ ∈ [0,1]
	which maximizes his profit	#, , , , , 
	: 
∗ = S0	#, , , , , 
.																																													A. 1
 																						 
The first order condition is: U	#, , , , , 

U	 = 	,1 − 1 − 
1 − 
- ≥ 0.																											A. 2
 
From A. 2
 and knowing that	,  ∈ [0,1]
, the optimal production level ∗, ,, , 
 of 
the producer  is so given by: 
∗, ,, , 
 = 1,  ∈ .																											A. 3
 
A.2 Investment in GAPs 
At a given	, ,, , 
, the rational behavior of a producer ,  ∈ 
 consists in seeking the 
level of investment ∗, ∗ ∈ [0,1]
 which maximizes his profit #, , , , , ∗
	 : 
∗ = S0	#, , , , , ∗
.																																													A. 4
 																							 
The conditions of first and second orders give: 
U	#, , , , , ∗

U		 = 0 ⟺  =
	1 − 
	
2	 ;																																											A. 5
 
U)	#, , , , , ∗

U)		 = −2	 ≤ 0.																																																																				A. 6
 
From A. 5
	and	A. 6
, the optimal level of investment	∗, , , 
, of producer  ∈  is 
given by: 
∗, , , 
 = min Z1, 	1 − 
	2	 [	.																																									A. 7
 
A.3 Price, Investment and profits at equilibrium 
Given	, 
, and	1, 1 ≤ 	
, producers activate on domestic market, the total quantity 
offered \], , 1
 in domestic market is given by: 
\], , 1
 = 1		I, , , 
.																																																							A. 8
 
If		 ≤ 2	, then 
By using (A.7), the optimal Investment	∗, , , 
, of a producer 	is: 
∗, , , 
 = 	1 − 
	2	 	.																																									A. 9
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By substituting A. 9
 inA. 3
, the optimal level of production	∗, , , , ∗
, of a 
producer 	is given by: 
∗, , , , 
 = 1.																																													A. 10
 
By substituting A. 9
 and A. 10
 inA. 8
, the total quantity offered	\], , , , 1
, in 
domestic market is: 
\], , , , 1
 = ,1 − 	1 − 
-	1 + )1 − 
)2	 + )1 − 
)	1 .																							A. 11
 
The sale price ∗, , , 1
 at equilibrium, is determined by the equalization of supply 
A. 11
 and demand	: 
\], , ∗, , 1
 =  ⟺	∗, , , 1
 = 2		, − ,1 − 	1 − 
-	1-2	 +	)1 − 
)	1	 .												A. 12
 
By substituting A. 12
	in	A. 9
, the optimal investment	∗, , , 1
, of producer  at market 
equilibrium is given by: 
∗, , , 1
 = 	1 − 
, − ,1 − 	1 − 
-	1-2	 +	)1 − 
)	1	 .												A. 13
 
By substituting A. 10
, A. 12
and A. 13
 in #, , , , , 
,	 the profit of a producer  at 
the market equilibrium is given by: 
#∗, , , 1
 = 	 − 1 − _
	1
,2	1 − _
2	 + _)	1
- + _) − 1 − _
	1
2	 +	_)	1
) .		A. 14
 
where:	_ = 	1 − 
. 
We can easily verify that: 
#∗, , , 1
 ≥ 0 ⟺ 1 ≤ 1 − 	1 − 
.																														 A. 15
 
A.4 Proof of proposition 1 
By using	A. 15
, we can deduce the expression of the number of producers ∗, 
 at the 
equilibrium: 
∗, 
 = min 2, 3 1 − 	1 − 
45.																																															 A. 16
 
By substituting A. 16
 in A. 12
	and	A. 13
, the investment level ∗, 
 and the market 
price ∗, 
at the equilibrium are given by: 
∗, 
 = 	1 − 
 6 − ,1 − 	1 − 
-
∗, 
7
2	 +	)1 − 
)∗, 
 .												A. 17
 
∗, 
 = 2		 6 − ,1 − 	1 − 
-
∗, 
7
2	 +	)1 − 
)∗, 
 .																								A. 18
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A.5 Types of countries 
By using	A. 16
, and in function of the market size  we can distinguish three countries 
types: 
Type 1 countries with	 ≥ 
, so: 
∗, 
 = .																																																																								A. 19
 
Type 2 countries with  ≤ ,1 − 	1 − 
-		so: 
∗, 
 = 	 3 1 − 	1 − 
4.																																																																								A. 20
 
Type 3 countries with	,1 − 	1 − 
- ≤  ≤ , so: 
∗, 
 = .																																																																								A. 21
 
Given the complexities of the third case (type 3 countries), we will restraint the analysis just 
on the two polar cases (ca e 1 and case 2). 
B. Type 1 countries: Impact of the evolution of food controls 
By substituting A. 19
 in A. 17
	and	A. 18
, the investment level ∗, 
 and the price 
∗, 
	at equilibrium are given respectively by: 
∗, 
 = 	1 − 
, − ,1 − 	1 − 
-	-2	 +	)1 − 
)	 .												B. 1
 
∗, 
 = 2		, − ,1 − 	1 − 
-	-2	 +	)1 − 
)	 .																								B. 2
 
B.1 Variation of a∗b, c
	over c : 
U	∗, 

U	 = 	
1 − 
,−	)1 − 
)		 − 
 + 4				1 − 
	 + 2		 − 
-
2	 + )1 − 
)	
) ; 		B. 3
 
U	∗, 

U	 = 0 ⟺  =  =
2		 + D2		
) + 2			 − 
)
1 − 
		 − 
 ≥ 1.																									B. 4
 
From B. 3
 and	B. 4
, we can deduce that: 
U	∗, 

U	 ≥ 0.																																																																			B. 5
 
B.2 Variation of d∗b, c
 over	c : 
U	∗, 

U	 = 	
−2		1 − 
			)1 − 
)	 + 2		1 − 
 − 
 − 2		

2	 + )1 − 
)	
) ; 				B. 6
 
U	∗, 

U	 = 0 ⟺  = B = 	
 − 
 + D − 
) + 2		
1 − 
	 .																																				B. 7
 
From B. 6
 and	B. 7
, we can deduce that: 
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U	∗, 

U	 e
≥ 0,					 ∈ G0, BH;
≤ 0,					 ∈ GB, 1	H. 																																																							B. 8
 
B.3 Variation of fgb, c
	over	c : 
JK, 
 = 	1 − 
1 − 
,1 − 
∗, 
-
	 61 − 1 − 
,1 − ∗, 
-7.																																						B. 9
 
U	JK, 
U	 = 0 ⟺  = 1			 ∨ 		 =
2	
1 − 
 − 
 ≥ 1.																						B. 10
 
From B. 9
	and	B. 10
, we can deduce that: 
U	JK, 
U	 ≤ 0.																																																													B. 11
 
 
 
Page 23 of 23 British Food Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
